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ABSTRACT
The dominant view in the empirical literature on exchange rates is that the high variability of real
exchange rates is due to movements in exchange-rate-adjusted prices of tradable goods. This paper
shows that this dominant view does not hold in Mexican data for the periods in which the country
had managed exchange rate regimes. Variance analysis of a 30-year sample of monthly data shows
that movements in the price of nontradables relative to tradables account for up to 70 percent of the
variability of the real exchange rate during these periods. The paper proposes a model in which this
stylized fact, and the Sudden Stops that accompanied the collapse of Mexico's managed exchange
rates, could result from an endogenous amplification mechanism operating via nontradables prices
in economies with dollarized liabilities and credit constraints. The key feature of this mechanism is
Irving Fisher's debt-deflation process. Numerical evaluation suggests that the Fisherian deflation
effects on consumption, the current account, and relative prices dwarf those induced by the standard











1.  Introduction 
  The dominant view in the empirical literature on real exchange rates is that exchange-
rate-adjusted relative prices of tradable goods account for most of the observed high variability 
of CPI-based real exchange rates (see the classic article by Engel (1999) and earlier work by 
Jenkins and Rogers (1995)). In an application of the variance analysis of his 1999 article to 
Mexican data, Engel (2000) concluded that this dominant view also applies to Mexico. Using a 
sample of monthly data from 1991 to 1999, he found that the fraction of the variance of the peso-
dollar real exchange rate accounted for by the variance of the Mexico-U.S. ratio of prices of 
tradable goods adjusted by the nominal exchange rate exceeds 90 percent, regardless of the time 
horizon over which the data are differenced.  
  Engel’s finding raises serious questions about the empirical relevance of a large literature 
that emphasizes the nontradables price as a key factor for explaining real exchange rates and 
economic fluctuations in emerging economies. The studies developed in the research program on 
“non-credible” exchange-rate-based stabilizations surveyed by Calvo and Vegh (1999) model the 
real exchange rate as a positive, monotonic function of the relative price of nontradables (with 
the latter determined at equilibrium by the optimality conditions for sectoral allocation of 
consumption and production). Lack of credibility in a currency peg leads to a temporary increase 
in tradables consumption and to a rise in the relative price of nontradables, and hence to a 
temporary real appreciation of the currency. More recently, the literature on Sudden Stops in 
emerging economies has emphasized the phenomenon of liability dollarization (i.e., the fact that 
debts in emerging economies are generally denominated in units of tradable goods, or in hard 
currencies, but partially leveraged on the incomes and assets of the large nontradables sector 
typical of these economies). With liability dollarization, real-exchange-rate collapses induced by 
sharp declines in the price of nontradables can trigger financial crashes and deep recessions. For 




depreciation of the currency and systemic bankruptcies in the nontradables sector. The real 
depreciation occurs because the market price of nontradables collapses as the lack of credit 
forces a reduction of tradables consumption, while the supply of nontradables remains unaltered.  
If nontradables prices account only for a negligible fraction of real exchange rate 
variability in emerging economies like Mexico, however, the above theories of Sudden Stops and 
of the real effects of exchange-rate-based stabilizations would lack empirical foundation.  
Moreover, the key policy lessons derived from these theories regarding strategies to cope with 
the adverse effects of non-credible stabilization policies, or to prevent Sudden Stops with their 
dramatic consequences for economic performance and welfare, would be rendered irrelevant.  
For example, the push to develop foreign debt instruments better protected from the adverse 
effects of liability dollarization, by indexing debt to output or commodity prices or by issuing 
debt at longer maturities or in domestic currencies, would be a costly effort that a key piece of 
empirical evidence does not support, despite the benefits that it could seem to have in theory.  
Thus, determining the main sources of the observed fluctuations of real exchange rates in 
emerging economies is a central issue for theory and policy.  
A closer look at the empirical evidence suggests, however, that the relative price of 
nontradables may not be irrelevant. Mendoza and Uribe (2001) reported large variations in 
Mexico’s relative price of nontradables during the country’s exchange-rate-based stabilization of 
1988-1994. They did not conduct Engel’s variance analysis, so while they showed that the price 
of nontradables rose sharply, their findings cannot establish whether or not the movement in the 
nontradables price was important for the large real appreciation of the Mexican peso. 
Nevertheless, their results suggest that one potential problem with Engel’s analysis of Mexican 
data is that it did not separate periods of managed exchange rates from periods of floating 
exchange rates. There is also panel data evidence on the role that liability dollarization has 




nontradables and the real exchange rate exists and is systematically related to the occurrence of 
Sudden Stops (see Calvo, Izquierdo and Loo-Kung (2005) and the analysis of credit booms in 
Chapter 4 of International Monetary Fund (2004)).  
  This paper has two objectives. The first objective is to conduct a variance analysis to 
determine the contribution of fluctuations in domestic prices of nontradable goods relative to 
tradable goods, vis-a-vis fluctuations in exchange-rate-adjusted relative prices of tradable goods, 
for explaining the variability of the real exchange rate of the Mexican peso against the U.S. 
dollar. The results show that Mexico’s nontradables goods prices display high variability and 
account for a significant fraction of real-exchange-rate variability in periods of managed 
exchange rates.  In light of these results, the second objective of the paper is to show that a 
financial accelerator mechanism at work in economies with liability dollarization and credit 
constraints produces amplification and asymmetry in the responses of the price of nontradables, 
the real exchange rate, consumption, and the current account to exogenous shocks. In particular, 
the model predicts that sudden policy-induced changes in relative prices, analogous to those 
induced by the collapse of managed exchange rate regimes, can set in motion this financial 
accelerator mechanism. Thus, the model predicts that, because of the effects of liability 
dollarization in credit-constrained economies, economies with managed exchange rates can 
display high volatility in the real exchange rate driven by the relative price of nontradables.   
The variance analysis is based on a sample of monthly data for the 1969-2000 period. 
The results replicate Engel’s (2000) results for a sub-sample that matches his sample. The same 
holds for the full sample and for all sub-sample periods in which Mexico did not follow an 
explicit policy of exchange rate management. The results are markedly different in periods in 
which Mexico managed its exchange rate (including periods with a fixed exchange rate and with 
crawling pegs). In these periods, the fraction of real-exchange-rate variability accounted for by 




widely with the time horizon of the variance ratios. Movements in Mexico’s nontradables 
relative prices can account for up to 70 percent of the variance of the real exchange rate. In short, 
whenever Mexico managed its exchange rate, the country experienced high real-exchange-rate 
variability but movements in the price of nontradables contributed significantly to explain it.  
  The Mexican data also fail to reproduce two other key findings of Engel’s work. In 
addition to the overwhelming role of tradables goods prices in explaining real exchange rates, 
Engel found that (a) covariances across domestic nontradables relative prices and cross-country 
tradables relative prices tend to be generally positive or negligible and (b) variance ratios 
corrected to take into account these covariances generally do not change results derived using 
approximate variance ratios that ignore them. Contrary to these findings, in periods in which 
Mexico had a managed exchange rate, the correlation between domestic nontradables relative 
prices and international tradables relative prices is sharply negative. The standard deviation of 
Mexico’s domestic relative prices is also markedly higher during these periods. As a result, 
measures of the contribution of tradables goods prices to real-exchange-rate variability corrected 
to take into account these features of the data are significantly lower than those that do not. 
  Recent cross-country empirical studies provide further time series and cross sectional 
evidence indicating that the relative price of nontradables explains a significantly higher fraction 
of real exchange rate variability in the presence of managed exchange rates. Naknoi (2005) 
constructed a large data set covering 35 countries and nearly 600 pairs of bilateral real exchange 
rates. She found that for many of these pairs Engel’s (1999) result hold but there are also many 
for which it does not, and in some the relative price of nontradables accounts for about 50 
percent of real exchange rate variability. She also found that the variability of the relative price 
of nontradables rises as that of the nominal exchange rate falls, and in some cases it exceeds the 
variability of exchange-rate-adjusted relative prices of tradable goods. Parsley (2003) examined 




using monthly data. He found that in subsamples with managed exchange rates for Hong Kong, 
Malaysia and Thailand, the relative price of nontradables could explain up to 50 percent of the 
variability of the real exchange rate. All these findings are also related to the well-known 
findings of Mussa (1986) and Baxter and Stockman (1989) showing that the variability of the 
real exchange rate is higher under flexible exchange rate regimes, although they did not study the 
decomposition of this variability in terms of the contributions of the relative prices of tradables 
vis-a-vis nontradables. 
  A common approach followed in the recent International Macroeconomics literature is to 
take the above empirical evidence as an indication of the existence of nominal rigidities affecting 
price or wage setting. This approach has been the focus of extensive research examining the 
interaction of nominal rigidities with alternative pricing arrangements (e.g., pricing to market, 
local v. foreign currency invoicing) and with different industrial organization arrangements (e.g., 
endogenous tradability). Unfortunately, the ability of these models to explain the variability of 
real exchange rates, even amongst country pairs for which the “dominant view” holds, is limited. 
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) found that models with nominal rigidities cannot explain the 
variability of real exchange rates in industrial countries unless the models adopt preferences 
separable in leisure and values for coefficients of relative risk aversion and capital adjustment 
costs, and for the periodicity of staggered price adjustments, that are at odds with empirical 
evidence. Moreover, theoretical analysis shows that it does not follow from the observation that 
the variance analysis of the real exchange rate changes in favor of the price of nontradables 
under managed exchange rates that nominal rigidities must be at work. This is because the 
equilibria obtained for monetary economies under alternative exchange rate regimes, and with or 
without nominal rigidities, can be reproduced in monetary economies with flexible prices, or 
even in non-monetary economies, with appropriate combinations of tax-equivalent distortions on 




Mendoza (2001) and Mendoza and Uribe (2001)). 
  Instead of emphasizing the role of nominal rigidities, this paper shows, using a simple 
non-monetary model of endogenous credit constraints with liability dollarization, that a strong 
amplification mechanism driven by a variant of Fisher’s debt-deflation process can induce high 
variability in the price of nontradables and in the real exchange rate in response to exogenous 
shocks. In particular, policy-induced shocks to relative prices akin to those triggered by a 
currency devaluation can set in motion this amplification mechanism. The financial accelerator 
that amplifies the responses of consumption, the current account, and the price of nontradables to 
shocks of “usual” magnitudes combines a standard balance sheet effect (because of the mismatch 
between the units in which debt is denominated and the units of the assets or incomes on which 
some of this debt is leveraged) with the Fisherian debt-deflation process (because an initial fall in 
the price of nontradables triggered by an exogenous shock tightens further credit constraints 
leading to a downard spiral in access to debt and the price of nontradables).  
A set of basic numerical experiments suggests that the quantitative implications of this 
financial accelerator are significant. The Fisherian debt-deflation process is a powerful vehicle 
for inducing amplification and asymmetry in the responses of the economy to exogenous shocks 
(particularly to changes in taxes that approximate the relative price effects of changes in the rate 
of devaluation of the currency). The magnitude of the effects that the Fisherian deflation has on 
the nontradables price, the real exchange rate and the current account dwarf those that result 
from the standard balance sheet effect that has been widely studied in the Sudden Stops 
literature. In this way, the model can account simultaneously for high variability of the real 
exchange rate and key features of the Sudden Stop phenomenon as the result of (endogenous) 
high variability of the relative price of nontradables. 
  The model is analogous to the models with liquidity-constrained consumers of the closed-




models reviewed by Arellano and Mendoza (2003). The setup provided in this paper is simpler in 
order to focus the analysis on the amplification mechanism linking Sudden Stops and real 
exchange rate movements driven by the relative price of nontradables. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 conducts the variance analysis of 
the Mexico-U.S. real exchange rate. Section 3 develops the model of liability dollarization with 
financial frictions in which “excess volatility” of the real exchange rate is caused by fluctuations 
in the relative price of nontradables. Section 4 presents conclusions and policy implications.   
2.   Variance Analysis of the Peso-Dollar Real Exchange Rate 
  This section presents the results of a variance analysis that follows closely the 
methodology applied in Engel (1999) and (2000).  The analysis uses non-seasonally-adjusted 
monthly observations of the consumer price index (CPI) and some of its components for Mexico 
(MX) and the United States (US) covering the period January, 1969 to February, 2000.  Mexican 
data were retrieved from the Bank of Mexico’s web site (http://www.banxico.org.mx), and those 
for the U.S. from the site maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://stats.bls.gov).  
Three price indexes were retrieved for each country: the aggregate CPI (P 
i for i=MX, US) and 
the consumer price indexes for durable goods (PD 
i for i=MX, US) and services (PS 
i for i=MX, 
US).  The dataset also includes the nominal exchange rate series for the monthly-average 
exchange rate of Mexican pesos per U.S. dollar (E) reported in the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics.  The real exchange rate was generated using the IMF’s convention: RER=P
MX/(EP
US).  
The data were transformed into logs, with logged variables written in lowercase letters. 
  Durable goods are treated as tradable goods and services are treated as nontradable 
goods.  This definition is in line with standard treatment in empirical studies of real exchange 
rates, and is also roughly consistent with a sectoral classification of Mexican data based on a 
definition of tradable goods as those pertaining to sectors for which the ratio of total trade to 




Following Engel (2000), simple algebraic manipulation of the definition of the real 
exchange rate yields this expression:  rert = xt + yt.  The variable xt is the log of the exchange-
rate-adjusted price ratio of tradables across Mexico and the United States:  xt = pdt 
MX-et - pdt 
US  
(this is the negative of Engel’s measure because the real exchange rate is defined here using the 
IMF’s definition).  If the strong assumptions needed for the law of one price to hold in this 
context were satisfied, xt should be a constant that does not contribute to explain variations in 
rert.  The variable yt includes the terms that reflect domestic prices of nontradables relative to 
tradables inside each country: yt = bt 
MX(pst 
MX-pdt
 MX) - bt 
US(pst 
US-pdt 
US), where bt 
MX and bt
US 
are the (potentially time-varying) weights of nontradables in each country’s CPI.  The logs of the 
relative prices of nontradables are therefore: mxpnt ≡ pst 
MX-pdt
 MX and uspnt ≡ pst 
US-pdt 
US.  
The results of the variance analysis of the peso-dollar real exchange rate are summarized 
in the four plots of Figure 1, which are based on the detailed results reported in Table 1 of 
Mendoza (2000).  This Table reports, in addition to the variance ratios for the real exchange rate, 
the standard deviations and correlations of rer, y, x, mxpn, and uspn.  As argued below, changes 
in these moments are useful for explaining the changes in the results of the variance analysis 
across fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. The discussion of the results below refers to the 
changes in the relevant moments, but the reader is referred to Mendoza (2000) for the complete 
set of moments.  
Each plot in Figure 1 shows curves for five different sample periods: (1) the full sample, 
(2) the sample studied by Engel (2000), which is a sample retrieved from Datastream for the 
period September, 1991 to August, 1999, (3) a sample that includes only data for the post-1994 
floating exchange rate, (4) a fixed exchange rate sample covering January, 1969 to July, 1976, 
and (5) a sample that spans the duration of the managed exchange rate regime that anchored the 




initial one-year period with a fixed exchange rate followed by a crawling peg within a narrow 
band (the boundaries of which were revised occasionally). 
Each of the four plots shows results for an alternative measure of the variance ratio that 
quantifies the fraction of real exchange rate variability explained by xt (i.e., the relative price of 
tradables). The ratios are plotted as functions of the time frequency over which the data were 
differenced (1, 6, 12, 24 and, for the samples with sufficient observations, 72 months). The four 
variance ratios considered are the following: 
(1)  Engel’s (2000) basic ratio σ 
2(x)/σ 
2(rer).  Since in general  σ 
2(rer) = σ 
2(x) + σ 
2(y)     
+2 cov(x,y), where cov(x,y) is the covariance between x and y, this basic ratio is accurate 
only when x and y are independent random variables (i.e., when cov(x,y) = 0).  For this 
reason, Engel (1995) computed the following second and third ratios as alternatives that 
adjust for covariance terms. 
(2)  The independent variables ratio, σ 
2(x)/[ σ 
2(rer) - cov(x,y)] , deducts from the variance 
of rer in the denominator of the variance ratio the effect of cov(x,y).   
(3)  The half covariance ratio, [σ 
2(x) + cov(x,y)] / σ 
2(rer), measures the contribution of x to 
the variability of rer by assigning to x half of the effect of cov(x,y) on the variance of rer.  
Since this half covariance ratio can be written as the product of the basic ratio multiplied 
by 1+ρ(x,y)(σ(y)/ σ(x)), where ρ(x,y) is the correlation between x and y, the basic ratio 
approximates well the half covariance ratio if ρ(x,y) is low and/or the standard deviation 
of x is large relative to that of y.   
(4)  The nontradables weighted covariance ratio, controls only for the covariance between x 
and the domestic relative price of nontradables in Mexico by re-writing the variance ratio 
as [σ 
2(x)/σ 
2(rer)] {1 + ρ(x,mxpn) [b
MXσ (mxpn) / σ (x)] }. The basic ratio approximates 




and/or the standard deviation of x is large relative to that of mxpn.   
The motivation for the fourth ratio follows from the fact that, while the half covariance 
ratio aims to correct for how much of the variance of rer is due to variables x and y taking their 
covariance into account, it is silent about the contributions of the various elements that conform y 
itself.  The latter can be important because y captures the combined changes in domestic relative 
prices of nontradables in Mexico and the United States, as well as the recurrent revisions to the 
weights used in each country’s CPI (which take place at different intervals in each country).  
Moreover, since the aggregate CPIs include nondurables, in addition to durables and services, y 
captures also the effects of cross-country differences in the prices of nondurables relative to 
durables.  Computing an exact variance ratio that decomposes all of these effects requires to 
control for the full variance-covariance matrix of  y, x, mxpn, uspn, b
MX and b
N .  Since data to 
calculate this matrix are not available, the nontradables weighted covariance ratio is used as a 
proxy that isolates the effect of the covariance between mxpn and rer.  The complement (i.e., 1 
minus the fourth variance ratio) is a good measure of the contribution of Mexico’s relative price 
of nontradables to the variance of the real exchange rate to the extent that: (a) movements in the 
CPI weights play a minor role, and (b) the correlation between mxpn and uspn is low and/or the 
variance of mxpn largely exceeds that of uspn.
2 
  The potential importance of covariance terms in the calculation of a variance ratio, and 
hence the need to consider alternative definitions of this ratio, is a classic problem in variance 
analysis.  Engel considered this issue carefully in his work on industrial country real exchange 
rates and on the peso-dollar real exchange rate, and he concluded that it could be set aside safely.  
As shown below, however, the features of the data that support this conclusion are not present in 
the data for Mexico’s managed exchange rates, and hence in this case the variance ratios that 
                                                 
2Computing this variance ratio requires an estimate for a constant value of b
MX, which was determined using 1994 
weights from the Mexican CPI, extracted from a methodological note provided by the Bank of Mexico (b




control for covariance effects play a crucial role.  Engel (1995) argued that in the case of the 
components of the real exchange rate of the United States vis-a-vis industrial countries, 
“comovements between x and y are insignificant in all cases, except when we use the aggregate 
PPI (producer price index) as the traded goods price index” (p. 31).  In addition, Engel (2000) 
noted that the basic ratio “tends to underestimate the importance of the x as long as the co-
variance term (between x and y) is positive (which it is at most short horizons), but any 
alternative treatment of the covariance has very little effect on the measured relative importance 
of the x component” (p. 9).  Under these conditions, the basic ratio is either very accurate (if 
ρ(x,y) is low) or in the worst-case scenario it represents a lower bound for the true variance ratio 
(if ρ(x,y) is positive).  In either case, a high ratio σ 
2(x)/σ 
2(rer) indicates correctly that real-
exchange-rate fluctuations are mostly explained by movements in tradable goods prices and in 
the nominal exchange rate. 
  The results shown in the four plots of Figure 1 for the full sample period are firmly in line 
with Engel’s findings, except in the very long horizon of 72 months.  At frequencies of 24 
months or less, the basic ratio always exceeds 0.94, and using any of the other ratios to correct 
for covariances across x and y, or across x and mxpn, makes no difference. These results reflect 
the facts that, for the full sample, the correlations between x and y and between x and mxpn are 
always close to zero, and the standard deviation of x is 3.5 to 3.7 times larger than that of y and 
2.9 to 3.7 times larger than that of mxpn (see Table 1 in Mendoza (2000) for details).  
Covariances of x with uspn are also irrelevant because the correlations between these variables 
are generally negligible and the standard deviations of uspn are all small.  Moreover, the 
correlations between mxpn and uspn are also negligible.  
  A very similar picture emerges for Engel’s (2000) sample and for the post-1994 floating 
period.  The one notable difference is that at frequencies higher than 1 month there are marked 




in principle add to the contribution of domestic relative price variations in explaining the 
variance of rer.  However, they can be safely ignored because the standard deviation of x dwarfs 
those of uspn and mxpn at all time horizons, and the latter still have to be reduced by the 
fractions b
MX and b
US respectively.  In summary, in periods in which the Mexican peso is 
floating, the variability of exchange-rate-adjusted tradables goods prices is so much larger than 
that of nontradables relative prices that covariance adjustments cannot alter the result that the 
relative price of nontradables is of little consequence for movements in the real exchange rate. 
The picture that emerges from Mexico’s managed exchange-rate regimes is very 
different.  For both the fixed rate sample and the sample for El Pacto, the basic ratio is very high 
but it often exceeds 1, indicating the presence of large covariance terms.  The other three 
variance ratios show dramatic reductions in the share of real-exchange-rate variability 
attributable to x compared to the results for periods without exchange rate management.  For 
instance, the half covariance ratio for the fixed exchange rate sample shows that the contribution 
of x to the variability of the real exchange rate reaches a minimum of 0.29 at the 6-month 
frequency and remains low at around 0.36 for 12- and 24-month frequencies. The nontradables 
weighted ratio, which corrects for the covariance between x and mxpn, is below 0.61 at 
frequencies higher than one month.  In the sample for El Pacto, the independent variables and 
half covariance ratios indicate that the contribution of x to the variability of the real exchange 
rate is below 0.6 at all frequencies (except for the half covariance ratio at the 12-month 
frequency, in which case it increases to 0.7).  The nontradables weighted ratio shows that, if only 
the covariance between x and mxpn is considered, the variance of rer attributable to x reaches a 
lower bound of 0.55 at the one-month frequency (although it increases sharply at the 24-month 
frequency before declining again at the 72-month frequency).  
These striking differences in the outcome of the variance analysis for periods of exchange 




(a) The standard deviations of the Mexican relative price of nontradables and the composite 
variable y increase significantly relative to the standard deviations of x (the ratios of the 
standard deviation of x to that of y now range between 0.7 and 1.2). 
(b) The correlations between x and y, and between x and mxpn fall sharply and become 
markedly negative (approaching -0.6 in most cases).   
  Two other important features are worth noting in comparing periods of managed and 
floating exchange rates:  (a) The correlation between x and rer is much lower in the former than 
in the latter (the correlation between x and rer is almost 1 at all time horizons in periods of 
floating exchange rates, while it ranges between 0.29 and 0.7 in the samples of managed 
exchange rates), and (b) in some of the managed exchange rate scenarios, particularly the 12- 
and 24-month horizons of the sample for El Pacto, the correlation between nontradable goods 
relative prices in Mexico and the United States is positive (it can be as high as 0.32).  This 
second result actually reduces the share of fluctuations in rer that can be accounted for by y 
because, as U.S. and Mexican relative prices of nontradable goods are more likely to increase 
together, differences in these domestic relative prices across countries tend to offset each other 
more, and hence are less important for real-exchange-rate fluctuations.   
  It is also worth noting that the only feature of the statistical moments of the data 
examined here that is robust to changes in the exchange rate regime is the fact that the variability 
of nontradables relative prices in Mexico always exceeds by a large margin that of the United 
States. For the full (El Pacto) sample, the ratio of the standard deviation of mxpn to that of uspn 
ranges from 3.7 (3.4) at the one-month frequency to 4.9 (7.1) at the 24-month frequency.  It is 
also true, however, that Mexico’s nontradables relative prices tend to be more volatile during 
currency pegs than when the exchange rate floats. The ratio of the standard deviation of mxpn for 
the sample for El Pacto to that for the post-1994 floating period doubles from 1 at the one-month 




nontradables in Mexico than in the United States, and when Mexico manages the exchange rate 
than when the peso floats, are significant features of the data that, according to the theoretical 
analysis of the next section, can play a central role in explaining why the price of nontradables 
accounts for a nontrivial fraction of the variability of Mexico’s real exchange rate in periods of 
exchange rate management. 
3.   Sudden Stops & Nontradables-Driven Real Exchange Rate Volatility 
  Section 2 showed that in periods in which Mexico managed its exchange rate, the relative 
price of nontradables accounted for a significant fraction of the high variability of the real 
exchange rate. This evidence raises the question: should we be concerned about volatility of the 
real exchange rate driven by nontradables goods prices?  This Section argues that we should. The 
main argument is that, in economies that suffer from liability dollarization, the Sudden Stop 
phenomenon and the high variability of the real exchange rate may both be the result of high 
volatility in nontradables goods prices. To make this argument, the Section examines a simple 
model in which endogenous credit constraints and liability dollarization produce a financial 
accelerator mechanism that amplifies the responses of consumption, the current account, the 
price of nontradables and the real exchange rate to exogenous shocks.  
Credit frictions and liability dollarization have been widely studied in the Sudden Stops 
literature. The goal here is to provide a basic framework that highlights how balance sheet effects 
and the Fisherian deflation process interact to trigger high volatility of the real exchange rate and 
Sudden Stops. The mechanism is similar to the ones that have been explored in more detail in the 
studies reviewed by Arellano and Mendoza (2003), particularly the two-sector dynamic 
stochastic equilibrium setup of Mendoza (2002). 
  Consider a conventional non-stochastic intertemporal equilibrium setup of a two-sector, 
representative-agent small open economy with endowments of tradables (yt
T ) and nontradables 
(yt




  () ()











= ∑  (1) 
subject to: 
  1 (1 ) TN N T N N
tt t t t t t t t t cp c y p y b b R T τ + ++ = + − ++  (2) 
  ( ) 1
TN N
tt t t by p y κ + ≥− + ≥− Ω (3) 
Utility is defined in terms of a composite good c that depends on consumption of tradables (ct
T ) 
and nontradables (ct
N ). This composite good takes the form of a standard constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) function, and the utility function u(⋅) is a standard increasing, twice-
continuously-differentiable and concave utility function. Since c is a CES aggregator, the 












⎛⎞ ⎟ ⎜ = Φ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎟ ⎜ ⎝⎠
 , 
where Φ is an increasing, strictly convex function of the ratio ct
T / ct
N. The price of tradables is 
determined in competitive world markets and normalized to unity without loss of generality.  pt
N 
denotes the price of nontradable goods relative to tradables. 
As is evident from the budget constraint (2), international debt contracts are denominated 
in units of tradables, so this economy features liability dollarization. The only asset traded with 
the rest of the world is a one-period bond that pays a constant gross real interest rate of R in units 
of tradables.   
World credit markets are imperfect. In particular, constraint (3) states that foreign 
creditors limit their lending to the small open economy so as to satisfy a liquidity constraint up to 
a debt ceiling. The liquidity constraint limits debt to a fraction κ of the value of the economy’s 
current income in units of tradables. The debt ceiling requires the debt allowed by the liquidity 
constraint not to exceed a maximum level Ω. This maximum debt helps rule out “perverse” 
equilibria in which agents could satisfy the liquidity constraint by running very large debts that 




The above credit constraints can be the result of informational frictions or institutional 
weaknesses affecting credit relationships (such as monitoring costs, limited enforcement, costly 
information, etc).  The contracting environment that yields the constraints is not modeled here 
for simplicity.  Instead, following the line of the studies on endogenous borrowing constraints 
surveyed by Arellano and Mendoza (2003), we take the credit constraints as given to focus on 
their implications for equilibrium allocations and prices. Note also that credit limits set in terms 
of the debt-income ratio as in (3) are common practice in actual credit markets, particularly in 
household mortgage and consumer loans. 
  The government imposes a tax τt on private consumption of nontradable goods, which is 
intended to approximate some of the effects of a change in the rate of depreciation of the 
currency that would emerge in a monetary model in which money economizes transaction costs 
or enters in the utility function (see Mendoza (2001)).
3 The government also maintains time-
invariant levels of unproductive government expenditures in tradables and nontradables, 
(, ) TN gg , and it is assumed to run a balanced budget policy for simplicity. Hence, any movements 
in the primary fiscal balance due to exogenous policy changes in the tax rate, or endogenous 
movements in the price of nontradables, are offset via lump-sum rebates or taxes Tt.  The 
government’s budget constraint is therefore: 
  NN T N N
tt t t t pc g pg T τ =+ +  (4) 
  A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of allocations  1 0 ,, , TN
tt t t ccT b
∞





∞ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  such that: (a) the allocations represent a solution to the households’ problem 
taking the price of notradables, the tax rate, and government transfers as given, (b) the sequence 
of transfers satisfies the government budget constraint given the tax policy, government 
                                                 
3 Adao, Correia and Teles (2005), Coleman (1996), and Mendoza and Uribe (2001) provide other examples in which 
the equilibria of monetary economies with alternative exchange rate regimes, and with or without nominal rigidities, 




expenditures, private consumption of nontradables and the relative price of nontradables, and (c) 
the following market-clearing condition in the nontradables sector holds: 
  NNN
tt cg y +=  (5) 




tt t t t cgyb R b + += − +  (6) 
  The analysis that follows shows that, in the economy described by equations (1)-(6), the 
responses of consumption, the current account, the real exchange rate, and the price of 
nontradables to exogenous shocks exhibit endogenous amplification via a financial accelerator 
mechanism when the credit constraints bind, and that this mechanism operates via balance-sheet 
and Fisherian-deflation effects triggered by movements in the relative price of nontradables. 
Since other studies have examined the quantitative implications of more sophisticated variants of 
this model that incorporate uncertainty, incomplete financial markets, and labor demand and 
supply decisions in the nontradables sector (see Mendoza (2002)), we focus here on the key 
aspects of the economic intuition behind the model’s financial accelerator.  
Equilibrium when the Credit Constraints Never Bind: Perfectly Smooth Consumption 
  Consider first a scenario in which the credit constraints never bind.  In this case, the 
model yields an equilibrium identical to the one that would be obtained with perfect credit 
markets. The economy borrows or lends at the world-determined interest rate with no other 
limitation that the standard No-Ponzi-Game condition, which requires the present value of 
tradables absorption to equal the tradables sector’s wealth. The latter is composed of 
nonfinancial wealth (W0) and financial wealth (Rb0), so that the economy faces this intertemporal 
budget constraint: 
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the equilibrium reduces to a textbook case of perfectly smooth consumption. In particular, 
assume that the economy satisfies the traditional stationarity condition βR=1 and that the 
nontradables output is time invariant ( NN
t yy = for all t).  Hence, it follows from (5) and the 
standard Euler equation for tradables consumption that  TT
t cc = for all t.  The intertemporal 
constraint in (7) implies then that the equilibrium sequence of tradables consumption is perfectly 
smooth at this level: 
  [ ] 00 (1 ) TT cW R b g β = − + −  (8) 
In addition, the optimality condition that equates the marginal rate of substitution in consumption 
of tradables and nontradables with the after-tax relative price of nontradables implies that the 
equilibrium price of nontradables is: 
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 (9) 
Since consumption of tradables is perfectly smooth and both the endowment and government 
consumption of nontradables are time-invariant by assumption, the result in (9) states that any 
variations in the relative price of nontradables result only from government-induced variations in 
the tax on nontradables consumption. Tax policy is neutral in the sense that variations in the tax 
alter the price of nontradables but not consumption allocations or the current account. Thus, if 
credit constraints never bind, tax-induced real devaluations are neutral (i.e., changes in the 
exchange rate regime make no difference for the behavior of the real exchange rate). 
As long as the credit constraints do not bind, the results in (8) and (9) hold for any time-
varying, deterministic, non-negative stream of tradables endowments. To compare this perfectly 
smooth equilibrium with the equilibrium of the economy with binding credit constraints, we 
study a particular stream of tradables income that provides an incentive for the economy to 
borrow at date 0. Using standard concepts from the Permanent Income Theory of consumption, 




sequence with a time-invariant endowment (or “permanent income”). Hence, the level of 
nonfinancial wealth in (7) satisfies:  ( ) 0 1 T yW β = − , where  T y is the time-invariant tradables 
endowment that yields the same present value of tradables income (i.e., the same wealth) as a 
given time-varying sequence paid to households. Define then a “wealth neutral” shock to date-0 
tradables income as a change in the date-0 endowment offset by a change in the date-1 
endowment that keeps the present value of the two constant (leaving the rest of the sequence of 
tradables income in W0 unchanged). Thus, wealth neutral shocks to date-0 income satisfy: 
  ( )
1
10
TT TT yy yy β− − = −  (10) 
Condition (10) states that, if the date-0 endowment falls below permanent income, the date-1 
endowment increases above permanent income by enough to keep the present value constant. 
Clearly, for any  01 0 TTT yyy <<<that satisfies (10) and for which the credit constraints 
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 (11) 
Hence, consumption allocations and the price of nontradables remain at their first-best levels, 
and there is a current account deficit at date-0 of equal size as the current account surplus at date 
1. Thus, the economy reduces asset holdings below b0 at date 0 (i.e., borrows), and returns to its 
initial asset position at date 1. Policy-induced real devaluations of the currency are still neutral 
with respect to all of these outcomes.  
The Economy with Binding Credit Constraints 
Now consider unanticipated, wealth-neutral shocks to y0
T that satisfy condition (10). If 
the shock to y0
T is not large enough to trigger the credit constraints, the solutions obtained in (11) 
still hold, but if the shock lowers y0
T to a level at or below a critical level, it will make the 














+  (12) 
Since we restrict the analysis to strictly positive endowments, condition (12) also implies an 
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.  If κ exceeds this critical value, the model 
allows for enough debt so that the liquidity constraint never binds for any positive value of y0
T. 
On the other hand, κ has a lower bound at the level at which satisfying the liquidity constraint 











  A critical observation about the result in (12) is that, for a given wealth-neutral pair (y0
T, 
y1
T ), a sufficiently large and unanticipated tax increase at date 0 (i.e., a policy-induced real 
depreciation) can also move the economy below the critical level of tradables income, and thus 
trigger the credit constraints, because it lowers the price of nontradables and the value of the 
nontradables endowment. Since, as shown below, this affects the equilibrium outcomes of 
consumption, the current account, the price of nontradables, and the real exchange rate, a policy-
induced real depreciation of the currency is no longer neutral once the credit constraints bind. 
Now alternative policy regimes yield very different outcomes for real exchange rate behavior.  
Assume a debt ceiling set at  1 b Ω = −  for simplicity. For shocks that put y0
T below its 
critical level, triggering the liquidity constraint, equilibrium allocations and prices for date 0 are: 
  00 00 0
TTT TN N cyg yp y R b κ⎡ ⎤ = − ++ + ⎣ ⎦  (13) 
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 (14) 
  10 0 0 0 0
TN N bb y p y b b κ ⎡ ⎤ − = − + − > Ω− ⎣ ⎦  (15) 
Since  10 01
TN N by p y b κ⎡⎤ = − +> ⎣⎦ , it is clearly the case that  00 0 1 0 1 0 ,, TT N N cc ppb b b b <<− > − . 




lower than in the perfectly smooth case, and the current account is higher. In other words, for 
shocks that put the tradables endowment below the critical level, the economy responds with a 
drop in tradables consumption, a real depreciation and a current account reversal (i.e., a Sudden 
Stop takes place). 
The above argument is similar to Calvo’s (1998): if the country cannot borrow, tradables 
consumption falls and this lowers the price of nontradables, which via a balance sheet effect and 
the liability dollarization feature of the credit constraint validates the country’s reduced 
borrowing ability. The difference with Calvo’s setup is that the equilibrium characterized by 
conditions (13)-(15) features also Fisher’s debt-deflation mechanism.  
The Fisherian deflation amplifies the responses of quantities and prices. In particular, the 
date-0 tradables consumption and price of nontradables are determined by solving the two-
equation system formed by (13)-(14).  Equation (13) shows that tradables consumption depends 
on the nontradables price when the credit constraint binds because of liability dollarization: 
changes in the value of the nontradables endowment affect the agents’ ability to borrow in 
tradables-denominated debt.  Equation (14) shows that the price of nontradables depends on the 
consumption of tradables via the standard optimality condition for sectoral consumption 
allocations. The Fisherian deflation occurs then because, as tradables consumption falls, the price 
of nontradables falls, and as this price falls the credit constraint tightens, which makes tradables 
consumption fall more, which then makes the price of nontradables fall more. 
Figure 2 illustrates the determination of the date-0 equilibrium when this Fisherian 
deflation process is at work.  The vertical line TT represents the perfectly smooth tradables 
consumption allocation, which is independent of the price of nontradables.  The PP curve 
represents the optimality condition for sectoral consumption allocations, which equates the 
marginal rate of substitution between tradables and nontradables with the corresponding after tax 




consumption is constant at  NN yg − , PP is an increasing, convex function of tradables 
consumption.  TT and PP intersect at the equilibrium price of the perfectly smooth consumption 
case (point A).   
The SS line represents equation (13), which is the tradables resource constraint when the 
liquidity constraint binds. SS is an upward-sloping, linear function of tradables consumption with 
a slope of 1 N y κ . Since the horizontal intercept of SS is  00 (1 ) TT Rb g y κ − ++ , SS shifts to the left 
as y0
T falls. In Figure 2, SS corresponds to the case when  0 ˆ TT yy = , so that tradables output is just 
at the point where the credit constraint is marginally binding. In this case, SS intersects TT and 
PP at point A, so that the outcome with constrained debt is the same as the perfectly smooth case.  
Consider a wealth-neutral shock to the date-0 tradables endowment such that  0 ˆ TT yy < . 
The SS curve shifts to SS’ and the new equilibrium is determined at point D. If prices did not 
respond to the drop in consumption, or if the borrowing constraint were set as a fixed amount 
independent of income and prices, the new equilibrium would be at point B. At B, however, 
tradables consumption is lower than in the perfectly smooth case, so equilibrium requires the 
price of nontradables to fall. If the credit constraint were independent on the nontradables price 
(as, for example, in the setup of Calvo (1998)), the new equilibrium would be at point C, with a 
lower nontradables price and lower tradables consumption. This outcome reflects the balance 
sheet effect induced by liability dollarization. But at C the Fisherian deflation is not yet taken 
into account. With the lower price at C in the PP line, the liquidity constraint tightens because 
the value of the nontradables endowment falls, forcing tradables consumption to fall so as to 
satisfy the constraint at a point in SS’, but at that point the nontradables price must fall again to 
re-attain a point along PP, but at that point tradables consumption falls again because the credit 
constraint tightens further. This Fisherian debt-deflation process continues until it converges to 




tradables consumption that are also consistent with the equilibrium condition for sectoral 
consumption allocations. In short, the response to the tradables endowment shock, which would 
be at point A for any shock that satisfies  0 ˆ TT yy ≥ , is amplified to point D because of the 
combined effects of the balance sheet effect and the Fisherian deflation. 
The above results apply also to the case in which there is no shock to the tradables 
endowment but the government increases τ0 by enough so that the resulting fall in p0
N puts 
ˆT y above y0
T. In this case, a policy change that could be intended to yield a “small” real 
depreciation of the currency can trigger the credit constraint, and result in a large current account 
reversal and collapses in tradables consumption, the price of nontradables and the real exchange 
rate. The policy neutrality of the perfectly smooth case no longer holds. 
One caveat of this analysis is that for low enough y0
T the economy would not be able to 
borrow at the competitive equilibrium. This occurs when y0
T is so low that the level of debt that 
satisfies the liquidity constraint exceeds Ω (or, in this case, the debt that would be contracted in 
the perfectly smooth equilibrium). Setting debt at this debt ceiling would imply a nontradables 
price at which the liquidity constraint is violated, but on the other hand, the debt level that 
satisfies (13)-(14), so that the liquidity constraint holds, would violate the debt ceiling. At 
corners like these, debt is set to zero and the economy is in financial autarky. In the remainder of 
this paper we concentrate on situations in which shocks result in values 0 ˆ TT yy ≤ such that there 
are internal solutions with debt (i.e., solutions for which Ω is not binding). 
  Further analysis of Figure 2 could raise questions about the existence and uniqueness of 
the equilibrium with Fisherian deflation, depending on assumptions about the position and slope 
of the SS line and the curvature of the PP curve. The model produces results that shed light on 
this issue, but these are highly dependent on the simplicity of the setup, which was motivated by 




deflation. Hence, the following results regarding the conditions that can produce or rule out 
multiple equilibria need to be considered with caution, as they may not be robust to important 
extensions of the model (like including uncertainty, capital accumulation or a labor market).    
Figure 2 suggests that a sufficiency condition to ensure a unique equilibrium with 
Fisherian deflation (for cases with 0 ˆ TT yy ≤ that yield internal solutions with debt) is that the PP 
curve be flatter than the SS line around point A. Since SS is an upward-sloping, linear function 
and PP is increasing and strictly convex, this assumption ensures that the two curves intersect 
only once in the interval between 0 and  T c .
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 (16) 
where 1/(1+μ) is the elasticity of substitution in consumption of tradables and nontradables.  
This condition sets an upper bound for the liquidity coefficient κ (different from the upper bound 
identified earlier, which determined a value of κ that is high enough to make the liquidity 
constraint irrelevant).  Since in most countries the nontradables sector is at least as large as the 
tradables sector, and consumption of tradables is lower than tradables output, it follows that z <1. 
Hence, (16) states that the sufficiency condition for a unique equilibrium with Fisherian deflation 
requires the liquidity coefficient to be lower than the fraction z of the elasticity of substitution. 
Existing empirical studies for developing countries show that the elasticity of substitution 
is less than unitary, ranging between 0.4 and 0.83 (see Ostry and Reinhart (1992), Mendoza 
(1995), Gonzales and Neumeyer (2003) and Lorenzo, Aboal and Osimani (2003)).  The sectoral 
data for Mexico reported by Mendoza (2002) show that, on average over the 1988-1998 period, 
                                                 
4 Unless P and SS are tangent at A, the curves also intersect once in the region with  0
TT cc > because (13) and (14) 
can be satisfied by setting  0
T c high enough to yield a  0
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, so that in Mexico z = 0.43. Given this value of z, supporting a 
debt ratio equal to the lowest net foreign asset-output ratio estimated for Mexico by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (1999), which is about -36 percent, requires using the upper bound of the 
estimates of the elasticity of substitution (i.e., 1/(1+μ) = 0.83).  With this elasticity and z =0.43, 
condition (16) implies κ < 0.357. This result also meets the condition required for the credit 
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, for 
any b0 ≤0. Hence, this rough review of empirical facts suggests that the sufficiency condition for 
which the model yields a unique equilibrium with Fisherian deflation is in line with the data. 
Quantitative Implications: Balance Sheet Effect v. Fisherian Deflation Effect 
What are the relative magnitudes of the balance-sheet and Fisherian-deflation effects that 
move the economy from A to D in Figure 2? The Figure suggests that, for a given value of the 
tradables endowment shock, the magnitude of the two effects depends on the curvature of the SS 
and PP curves, which in turn depends on the relative magnitudes of the liquidity coefficient and 
the sectoral elasticity of substitution in consumption. 
A lower liquidity coefficient increases the slope of the SS curve. This strengthens the 
balance sheet effect but its effect on the Fisherian deflation is not monotonic. Starting from a 
high κ at which the credit constraint was just marginally binding (and hence the Fisherian 
deflation effect was irrelevant), lowering κ strengthens the Fisherian deflation. As κ falls further, 
however, the Fisherian deflation weakens because the feedback between the nontradables price 
and the ability to borrow weakens (in the limit, for κ = 0 there is no Fisherian deflation, but this 
is also the case when κ is too high for the credit constraint to ever bind).  A higher elasticity of 
                                                                                                                                                             
to finance this high consumption. This outcome is not an equilibrium, however, because the resulting debt level 




substitution between tradables and nontradables makes the PP curve flatter, which strengthens 
both the balance sheet effect and the Fisherian deflation. 
The following numerical experiments illustrate the potential magnitudes of the balance- 
sheet and Fisherian-deflation effects, using a set of parameter values and calibration assumptions 
that match some empirical evidence from Mexico. We consider a Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion (CRRA) period utility function,  ( )
1 () / ( 1 ) uc c σ σ − = − , and a CES aggregator for sectoral 
consumption, 
1/
() ( 1 ) () TN ca c a c
μ μμ − −− ⎡⎤ =+ − ⎣⎦ . 
The subjective discount factor and the coefficient of relative risk aversion are set to 
standard values of β =0.96 and σ =2.  We take Mendoza’s (2002) estimate of the share parameter 
of the CES aggregator for Mexico, a =0.342.  The elasticity of substitution between tradables and 
nontradables is set to the upper bound of the range of estimates cited earlier (0.83), which 
implies μ =0.204.  
The model is calibrated to match Mendoza’s (2002) estimates of Mexico’s ratio of 
nontradables GDP to tradables GDP at current prices (1.543), and the sectoral shares of tradables 
(nontradables) consumption in tradables (nontradables) GDP, which are 66 and 71 percent 
respectively.  Total “permanent” output is normalized to 1, so that the results of the quantitative 
experiments can be interpreted as shares of “permanent” GDP.  We also allow for “permanent” 
absorption of tradables and nontradables that include government purchases and private 
investment, so that the model can match the observed consumption-output ratios. The tax rate is 
set to zero, which implies a baseline scenario in which government expenditures are financed 
with lump sump taxation.  Initial external debt is set to 1/3 of permanent GDP, in the range of the 
time series of the net foreign asset-GDP ratio produced for Mexico by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(1999). With these calibrated parameter values, the perfectly smooth equilibrium yields 




0.77 N p = , so that the aggregate consumption-output ratio matches the ratio from Mexican data: 
( ) ( ) /0 . 6 9 TN N TN N cp c yp y ++ = . 
Figure 3 illustrates the quantitative predictions of the model for a range of values of the 
liquidity coefficient 0.21<κ<35, assuming a shock that lowers  0
T y to a level 3 percent below its 
permanent level. The lower bound of the liquidity coefficient is the lowest value of κ that can 
support positive tradables consumption with a binding liquidity constraint. The upper bound is 
the highest value of κ at which the constraint still binds (higher values would imply that the 
credit constraint does not bind for the 3 percent shock to tradables income, so that the perfectly 
smooth equilibrium would be maintained). 
Figure 3.a shows the bond position of the economy at date 0 in three situations: the 
continuous curve is for the economy with the binding credit constraint, the dotted line is for the 
economy with perfect credit markets, and the dashed line is the value of the fraction κ of income 
valued at tradables goods prices in this same economy (i.e., it shows the value of bonds that 
would satisfy the liquidity constraint at the nontradables price of the perfectly smooth 
equilibrium). The credit constraint binds whenever the dashed line is above the dotted line.  The 
vertical distance between the dashed line and the continuous curve represents the effect of the 
endogenous collapse in the price of nontradables on the ability to contract debt.  This effect 
grows very rapidly as κ falls, and it can imply a correction in the debt position (and in the current 
account) of over 10 percentage points of permanent GDP. 
Figures 3b and 3c illustrate the effects of the credit constraints on tradables consumption, 
the relative price of nontradables, and the real exchange rate (measuring each as a percent 
deviation from their values in the perfectly smooth equilibrium). The plots decompose the total 
effect of the constraints on tradables consumption and the nontradables price into two 




deflation. The total effect corresponds to a comparison of points A and D in Figure 2. The 
balance sheet effect compares A and C, and the Fisherian deflation compares C and D.  
The negative effects of the liquidity constraint on tradables consumption and the relative 
price of nontradables are large and grow rapidly as κ falls. With κ set at 33 percent, tradables 
consumption and the price of nontradables fall by nearly 50 percent, and the CPI-based measure 
of the real exchange rate (i.e., the CES price index associated with the CES aggregator of 
sectoral consumption) falls nearly 37 percent. These declines are driven mainly by the Fisherian 
deflation, as the contribution of the pure balance sheet effect is less than 7 percent for both 
tradables consumption and the price of nontradables.  
The effect of the Fisherian deflation is strongest with κ around 30 percent, and it becomes 
weaker for lower values of κ. In the worst-case scenario, with κ at 20 percent, tradables 
consumption and the nontradables price approach zero. However, even for these low values of 
the liquidity coefficient, the contribution to the collapses in consumption and prices are split 
about 50-50 between the balance sheet effect and the Fisherian deflation. Hence, the contribution 
of the Fisherian deflation process is at least as large as that of the balance sheet effect. 
Figure 3d shows the welfare cost of the Sudden Stops shown in Figures 3a-3c. Welfare 
costs are computed as compensating variations in a time-invariant consumption level that equates 
lifetime utility in the economy with credit constraints with that of the economy with perfect 
credit markets (in which the perfectly smooth equilibrium prevails at all times).  With κ at 33 
percent, the welfare loss measures 1.1 percent, and the loss increases rapidly as κ falls.    
  Figure 4 shows a similar set of results as Figure 3 but for adverse shocks to the date-0 
tradables endowment of different magnitudes, fixing κ at 34 percent. The shocks range between 
0 and 12.4 percent of the permanent tradables endowment (1-0.124 = 0.876 and 1 in the 




liquidity constraint begins to bind is 1.9 percent, so shocks between 0 and 1.9 percent do not 
trigger the constraint and yield the perfectly smooth equilibrium. The upper bound of the shocks 
at 12.4 percent is the largest shock that satisfies the maximum debt constraint (i.e., the constraint 
stating that debt must not exceed the level corresponding to the perfectly smooth equilibrium). 
The adjustment in the debt position is severe and increases rapidly with the size of the 
shock. A 5 percent shock to the tradables endowment implies a reduction in debt of about 15 
percentage points of permanent income. Tradables consumption and the price of nontradables 
fall about 60 percent below the levels of the perfectly smooth equilibrium, with most of the 
decline accounted for by the Fisherian deflation. The CPI-based measure of the real exchange 
rate falls by about 47 percent. The welfare loss implied by the Sudden Stops triggered by this 5 
percent shock measures 1.7 percent in terms of a compensating variation in a lifetime-utility-
equivalent level of consumption. All these effects (except the contribution of the Fisherian 
deflation) grow rapidly as the size of the shock increases. 
Finally, consider a policy experiment that switches from the tax rate consistent with a 
fixed exchange rate (i.e., τ =0) to a floating rate for which the rate of depreciation of the currency 
settles at levels consistent with a fixed, positive value of τ (alternatively, this experiment can be 
viewed as a case in which the government aims to induce a real depreciation by increasing τ).  
This experiment sets  0 ˆ TT yy = , which by construction implies that at a zero tax rate the credit 
constraint is marginally binding (i.e., at τ = 0 the economy is at point A in Figure 2). Figure 5 
shows the results of tax increases varying from 0 to 5 percent. Note that, since for a zero tax rate 
and  0 ˆ TT yy = the credit constraint is marginally binding, and since with a non-binding credit 
constraint the tax hike would induce at most a real depreciation of 3 percent (if the tax were 
raised to the 5-percent maximum), the government could have good reason to expect that the tax 




outcome would deviate sharply from this expectation because increasing the tax triggers the 
credit constraint. Increasing the tax rate by 5 percentage points induces a correction of 8 
percentage points of permanent tradables income in the net foreign asset position of the 
economy. Consumption falls by 30 percent relative to the perfectly smooth equilibrium, the 
relative price of nontradables falls by 35 percent, and the real exchange rate depreciates by about 
23 percent. As in the other two experiments, the amplification in the declines of consumption, 
the price of nontradables, and the real exchange rate is largely due to the Fisherian debt-deflation 
effect, with a negligible contribution of the balance sheet effect. This policy-induced real 
depreciation results in a welfare loss of nearly 0.4 percent in terms of a stationary tradables 
consumption path. 
In summary, the results of these numerical experiments suggest that, in the presence of 
liability dollarization and credit-market frictions, the Fisherian deflation mechanism can be an 
important source of amplification and asymmetry in the response of emerging economies to 
negative shocks. The Fisherian deflation causes large declines in consumption and the price of 
nontradables, as well as large real depreciations and large reversals in the current account. 
Moroever, in this environment, policy-induced real depreciations can trigger the credit 
constraints and the Fisherian deflation mechanism, and therefore they can induce collapses in the 
price of nontradables and large real depreciations of the currency.  These results suggest that the 
Fisherian deflation mechanism may help account for the empirical observation that the relative 
price of nontradables accounts for a significant fraction of the variability of the real exchange 
rate in economies with managed exchange rate regimes. 
4.   Conclusions 
  This paper reported empirical evidence based on Mexican and U.S. monthly data for the 
1969-2000 period showing that fluctuations in Mexico’s relative price of nontradable goods 




Mexico was under a managed exchange rate regime. The main lesson drawn from this evidence, 
and from cross-country studies by Naknoi (2005) and Parsley (2003) showing that this is a robust 
result across developing countries, is that the behavior of the determinants of the real exchange 
rate differs sharply between countries with features similar to Mexico’s and the industrial 
countries to which variance analysis of real exchange rates is normally applied. In particular, the 
overwhelming role of movements in prices of tradable goods and nominal exchange rates found 
in industrial countries, or in developing countries with floating exchange rates, is sharply 
diminished in developing countries with managed exchange rates.   
The finding that in a typical emerging economy like Mexico, large fluctuations in the real 
exchange rate can be driven by movements in the relative price of nontradables during periods of 
exchange rate management, suggests that the phenomenon of liability dollarization emphasized 
in the Sudden Stops literature deserves more attention. This paper proposed a basic model to 
illustrate how liability dollarization introduces amplification and asymmetry in the responses of 
the economy to adverse shocks via a financial accelerator that combines a balance sheet effect 
with Irving Fisher’s debt-deflation mechanism. The balance sheet effect and the Fisherian 
deflation result in collapses in the real exchange rate that are driven by collapses in the relative 
price of nontradables. A set of basic numerical experiments suggests that the quantitative 
implications of these frictions, particularly the effects of the Fisherian deflation, can be 
significant. Of particular interest are the results for a policy-induced real depreciation (or a shift 
from a fixed exchange rate regime to a constant, positive rate of depreciation), showing that this 
paper’s financial accelerator can produce large collapses in the relative price of nontradables, the 
real exchange rate and consumption, together with a large current account reversal (starting from 
a situation in which credit constraints were marginally binding). 
The results indicating that roughly a half of the variability of the real exchange rate can 




that the recent literature on the business cycle implications of exchange rate management has 
produced (see Mendoza and Uribe (2001)). Further empirical research along the lines of the 
studies by Naknoi (2005) and Parsley (2003) should focus on comparing the experiences of 
industrial and developing countries so as to shed more light on whether variance analysis of 
other real exchange rates pairing emerging markets with industrial countries display similar 
sensitiveness to the exchange-rate regime as the peso-dollar real exchange rate. In addition, 
further analysis is needed to examine whether the role of the nontradables price in accounting for 
real-exchange-rate variability depends on the degree of liability dollarization of the economy. 
  The analysis undertaken here avoided intentionally taking a position on the best modeling 
strategy to account for the nontrivial fraction of real-exchange-rate variability explained by 
movements in tradable goods prices and the nominal exchange rate. In particular, the evidence 
reported here for periods without exchange rate management, in which a large fraction of real-
exchange-rate variability is due to changes in relative prices of tradable goods and the nominal 
exchange rate, does not suggest per se that one should view fluctuations in the variable x as 
deviations from the law of one price or evidence of price or wage stickiness. It simply shows 
how much x (i.e., the ratio of exchange-rate-adjusted CPI prices of durable goods across Mexico 
and the United States) contributes to explain the variance of the ratio of exchange-rate-adjusted 
aggregate CPIs.  This is distant from the ideal scenario needed to interpret changes in x as 
deviations from the law of one price. The law of one price applies to single, homogeneous goods 
sold in a freely-accessible market and in the absence of frictions like transportation costs and tax 
or tariff distortions. Clearly, aggregate data for the CPIs of Mexico and the United States violate 
these conditions. The goods included in these indexes are different, carry different weights, and 
the weights change a different intervals. Access to a “common market” has varied widely over 
the sample period and across goods, and similar caveats apply to transportation costs and tariffs.   




take the above issues into account, and still find evidence of large price differentials for highly 
disaggregated consumer goods. Some researchers are concerned with the impossibility of 
defining a pure concept of “tradable” goods as required by the law of one, and are thus studying 
the “degree of tradability of goods” (see Betts and Kehoe (2000)) or distribution costs (see 
Busrtein, Neves, and Rebelo (2000)). 
  The treatment of the data in the empirical analysis conducted here abstracts from 
medium- to low-frequency considerations, including those related to mean-reverting properties 
of real exchange rates and to the long-run determination of real exchange rates.  However, 
research in this direction is also inconclusive, as the survey by Froot and Rogoff (1995) shows.  
For example, Asea and Mendoza (1994) find that while the data support predictions of long-run 
neoclassical models in which cross-country differences in the relative price of nontradable goods 
reflect differences in productivity across sectors that produce tradables and nontradables, 
measures of the long-run relative price of nontradables do poorly in explaining cross-country 
differences in CPI-based measures of the real exchange rate.  At medium time frequencies, it is 
interesting to note that the variance ratios based on 72-month differences of the data, which 
correspond to the six-year periodicity of recent Mexican business cycles, the contribution of 
variable x to the variance of the real exchange rate is about 65 percent (both for the full sample 
and for the period of the managed exchange rate that ended in 1994).   
  The findings of this paper provide an argument in favor of policies that seek to stabilize 
the real value of the currency. Traditional exchange rate management is not useful because 
currency collapses trigger large movements in relative prices together with Sudden Stops in 
consumption and the current account. Instead, the model favors policies that can be successful at 
preventing large fluctuations in the real exchange rate. The setup of the model suggests in 
particular the use of sectoral tax policy, which would seek to contain the deflationary pressure on 




interpreted more broadly to consider policies that can remove the liability dollarization problem 
(for example, the full adoption of a hard currency as the domestic currency) or monetary policies 
under “de jure” floating exchange rates that can prove effective to prevent large swings in the 
real value of the currency (as many emerging countries that claim adherence to inflation 
targeting rules could be showing in practice). 
  An alternative to policies that prevent large fluctuations in the relative price of 
nontradables is to consider changing the nature of emerging economies’ debt instruments to 
make them less susceptible to the adverse effects of balance sheet and Fisherian deflation effects. 
This is in line with recent proposals favoring issuing bonds only in domestic currencies or 
indexed to the evolution of output or key commodity prices (as was done by Argentina in its 
recent debt conversion using partially bonds indexed to output). However, whether emerging 
economies can be successful at establishing liquid markets for these instruments unilaterally, or 
whether there is enough interest in them in world financial markets, remains an open question.  
Clearly, if creating markets for the state-contingent claims that can neutralize financial 
accelerator mechanisms driving Sudden Stops is feasible, this is the most preferable policy.  But 
assuming that this is not feasible, domestic policies aimed at stabilizing the relative price of 
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Figure 1. Fraction of Mexico's Real Exchange Rate Variability Explained by Tradables Goods Prices
at Different Time Frequencies 
 
 
Figure 2. Equilibrium in the Nontradables Market with Fisherian Deflation 
 
Figure 3.   Date-0 Effects of Changes in the Liquidity Coefficient 
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4a.  Bond Positions
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4c. Nontradables Price Effects






































4d. Welfare Cost of Credit Constraints



































Figure 5.  Date-0 Effects of a Policy-Induced Real Depreciation
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5d. Welfare Cost of Credit Constraints
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